‏قومی احتساب بیورو(نیب) جو نا معلوم افراد اور پڑوسی کی جھوٹی درخواست پر پکوڑوں اور سموسوں پر ریفرینس داخل کر دیتا ہے۔ ۔ کیا وہ جنرل اشفاق پرویز کیانی، جنرل پرویز مشرف، جنرل اختر عبدالرحمن خان کے سوئز بینکوں میں کھربوں روپیئے کے آکائونٹس لیک ہونے کے بعد ان کرپٹ اور چور جنرلوں پر ریفرنس داخل کریگا؟

SuisseSecrets: Bank of Spies: Credit Suisse Catered to Global Intelligence Figures

During the global War on Terror, international strategy relied on intelligence officials from regimes accused of corruption and torture. A number of these spies, and their families, have held large sums at Credit Suisse
OCCRPPremium.

(TimesNDRbyOCCRP, Premium Times and 2 others February 20, 2022).

Saudi Arabia matched U.S. funding to the jihadists dollar for dollar, often sending the money to the CIA’s Swiss bank account. The end recipient in the process was Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence group (ISI), led by General Rahman.

By the mid-1980s, Mr Akhtar was adept at getting CIA cash into the hands of Afghan jihadists. It was around this time that Credit Suisse accounts were opened in the names of his three sons. As Mohammad Yousaf, a colleague of Akhtar’s at the ISI who later penned a book about the time, wrote: “The combined [U.S. and Saudi] funds, running into several hundred million dollars a year, were transferred by the CIA to special accounts in Pakistan under the control of ISI.”

Both Yousaf and Steve Coll — author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning 2005 book Ghost Wars — claim Mr Akhtar was the man who decided where this cash went next. To train the mujahideen in sophisticated weaponry, the CIA trusted him with millions. By 1984, the CIA’s Afghanistan budget alone was some $200 million.

Oversight was chronically lax, and Mr Akhtar’s role has long been questioned.

One South Asian intelligence source with knowledge of Afghanistan operations told OCCRP: “It was easy at that point in time to open Swiss banking accounts of any manner or type for transfer of overt funds.”

“Akhtar was doing it to fill his own pockets,” the source said. “A lot of money was siphoned off from the Afghan war and into his bank accounts.”

One of the two Akhtar family accounts at Credit Suisse — held jointly by Mr Akhtar’s sons Akbar, Ghazi, and Haroon — was opened on July 1, 1985, when the sons were in their late 20s and early 30s. That same year, U.S. President Ronald Reagan would raise concerns about where the money intended for the mujahideen was going. By 2003, this account was worth at least five million Swiss francs ($3.7 million). A second account, opened in January 1986 in Akbar’s name alone, was worth more than 9 million Swiss francs ($9.2 million) by November 2010.

Mr Akhtar died in a 1988 plane crash that also claimed his boss, Pakistani dictator Zia-ul-Haq.
Akbar and Haroon Khan did not respond to requests for comment. In a message to OCCRP, Ghazi Khan called information presented by reporters about the family’s Swiss accounts “not correct,” and said it was “denied,” but did not elaborate.

Ghaleb Al-Qamish: The ‘Black Box’
As the CIA and Mr Akhtar were collaborating on Afghanistan, Yemen’s Ghaleb Al-Qamish was starting his own rise.

By 1980, Mr Qamish headed Yemen’s Political Security Office (PSO), which was in charge of domestic intelligence. Just as Akhtar was doing from Pakistan, Qamish recruited fighters for the Afghan war against the Soviets.

A looming figure over Yemen’s security apparatus for decades, Mr Qamish was a key enforcer for strongman President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled from 1978 to 2012. When Al-Qaeda bombed the American destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden in 2000, Mr Saleh tasked an initially reluctant Mr Qamish with helping the CIA flush out the suspects.

According to three officers who worked under Mr Qamish at Yemen’s PSO, he was the nation’s most feared security official, described as Mr Saleh’s “black box.” The three sources, who requested anonymity for fear of reprisals, told OCCRP that Mr Qamish had “an open budget made up of millions of dollars” to do with as he pleased.

By the time he had become Yemen’s chief spy, helping the Americans to unravel terror cells in the early 2000s, Mr Qamish also had inexplicable millions tucked away at Credit Suisse.

His account, opened in 1999, the year before the Cole attack, was worth almost 5 million Swiss francs ($3.7 million) by 2006, the same year that some of the Cole suspects escaped a Yemeni prison. Mr Qamish’s monthly salary was probably between $4,000 and $5,000 a month, including allowances and bonuses, according to the former intelligence officers and official Yemeni salary law guidelines.

Mr Qamish was accused of various abuses, including participating in the U.S. extraordinary rendition programme, which saw millions in CIA funds lavished on officials and other helpers in allied countries. Official documents show huge payments were made to countries that hosted black sites, and those who performed torture and interrogationsis account, opened in 1999, the year before the Cole attack, was worth almost 5 million Swiss francs ($3.7 million) by 2006, the same year that some of the Cole suspects escaped a Yemeni prison. Mr Qamish’s monthly salary was probably between $4,000 and $5,000 a month, including allowances and bonuses, according to the former intelligence officers and official Yemeni salary law guidelines.

Mr Qamish was accused of various abuses, including participating in the U.S. extraordinary rendition programme, which saw millions in CIA funds lavished on officials and other helpers in allied countries. Official documents show huge payments were made to countries that hosted black sites, and those who performed torture and interrogations.

SHAFIQ KHAN CANADA February 20, 2022